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Abstract
We consider a social system of interacting heterogeneous agents with learning abilities,
a model close to Random Field Ising Models, where the random field corresponds to the
idiosyncratic willingness to pay. Given a fixed price, agents decide repeatedly whether to
buy or not a unit of a good, so as to maximize their expected utilities. We show that the
equilibrium reached by the system depends on the nature of the information agents use to
estimate their expected utilities.
1 Introduction
Individual decisions in social systems are frequently influenced by the behaviors or choices of
other individuals. Besides the obvious case of fashion [28], many situations of social influence
have been considered and analyzed in the literature. They range from sociological issues like
the decision of attending a bar that may be crowded [2], a seminar that may have vanishing
attendance [36], choosing a movie or a restaurant [3], committing crime [16], to political issues
such as the decision of joining a riot [19], voting for or against a new constitution [14], etc.
The first models, proposed by Schelling [34], were aimed at demonstrating that the collective
outcomes when individuals interact socially with each other may seem paradoxical – that is,
intuitively inconsistent with the intentions of the individuals who generate them. In fact,
the collective states that result from the aggregation of individual decisions not voluntarily
coordinated, cannot be predicted by any simple counting or extrapolation of the individual
preferences. Schelling [36] built simple models of social paradoxes, like the existence of racial
segregation in urban neighbourhoods despite the non-racist character of the inhabitants, the
death of a weekly seminar by lack of participants despite their interest on it, etc. The reason of
these paradoxes is to be found in the fact that systems with interacting individuals may present
multiple equilibria. These may be analyzed in a natural way in the framework of statistical
physics.
Models of interacting agents facing binary decision problems have been considered within
an economical framework ([5, 29, 11, 15]) after Follmer [13] first used the finite-temperature
Ising model in a homogeneous external field to analyze equilibria in a two-goods market.
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In this paper we consider a general model introduced in Gordon et al. [18] and Nadal et
al. [26], where the interacting agents have different private willingnesses to pay, i.e. different
local fields. The individual utilities are the sum of the private and the interactions terms.
Interactions are assumed to be global and positive, so that utilities increase proportionally to
the total fraction of buyers. Global interactions are pertinent when the individual utilities
depend on decisions of remote and probably unknown individuals. This is the case of the
subscription to a telephone network [31, 32], or the choice of a standard [20], where making the
same decision as the majority carries advantages. Notice that this kind of aggregated data may
be easily available through public information. In statistical mechanics, this model belongs to
the class of mean-field ferromagnetic Random Field Ising Models.
As shown by Gordon et al. [17] when the social interactions are strong enough, the system
presents multiple (Nash) zero temperature equilibria. The one that is individually and globally
optimal is called Pareto-dominant equilibrium in economics. However, in contrast with physical
systems where energy and entropy determine the actual thermodynamic equilibrium, none of the
possible equilibria may be ruled out in social systems. Multiple equilibria bring on coordination
dilemmas to the agents. The equilibrium actually reached by the system depends on the decision
making dynamics.
In game theory, mostly limited to two-player games, it is usually assumed that individuals
possess the skills and the information necessary to analyze the consequences of all the possible
outcomes. Thus, they are able to find which is the optimal decision, and thus realize the
Pareto-optimal equilibrium. However, in situations with large numbers of participants like the
one considered here, or in situations of uncertainty, individuals may be unable to grasp the
information necessary for coordination. In fact, they are more likely to rely on beliefs rather
than on a perfectly rational reasoning to make decisions. Deviations from rationality may
arise not only in situations of limited or incomplete information, but also due to human errors,
different psychological attitudes with respect to risk, etc.
We are interested in situations where agents make their decisions repeatedly. In that case
they may modify their beliefs by learning through past experiences. To this end we assume that
each agent associates an expected surplus or payoff to buying. Once the decisions are made ac-
cording to these expectations, the latter are in turn updated based on the grasped information,
using a learning rule. This process is called learning upon experience in the literature. Behav-
ioral learning is actually the subject of important theoretical studies in different disciplines, in
particular in the context of game theory (see e.g. [4, 21, 22, 38]) and in ’econophysics’ (see
e.g. [8, 23, 1, 27]). Quite importantly, an increasing access to empirical data allows to compare
theoretical predictions with observed behaviors [7, 37].
We have studied the equilibria reached by the system for different learning rules proposed in
the literature to explain outcomes in experimental economics. Following Camerer [7], we intro-
duce a small number of parameters allowing to study all these rules within a single framework.
Here we report our most interesting results, obtained through weighted belief learning and
reinforcement learning. In these settings, buyers update their expectations according to their
obtained surplus, while non-buyers use a degraded information. We compare results for two
different information conditions. In one of them, that we call s-learning, the agents estimate the
expected surpluses based on actual payoffs. In the other, called η-learning, they estimate them
based on the fraction of individuals they expect will buy. In the latter case, agents are assumed
to know the additive structure of the utility function. Our analysis is limited to populations of
homogeneous learners: all the agents use the same learning rule, although they make different
initial guesses. Results obtained with the standard iterative steepest ascent used to determine
the local equilibria in Ising model simulations, where at each time step individuals make the
best decision conditionally to the previous period outcome – a dynamics called myopic fictitious
play in game theory –, serve as reference for our analysis.
We show that coordination of learners on the optimal (Nash) equilibrium, not only in the
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presence of multiple equilibria but even when the equilibrium is unique, is far from being the
norm. In fact, fairly restrictive conditions are needed. The emerging collective state depends
strongly on the values of the learning parameters, and is very sensitive to the agents’ initial
beliefs. There are significant differences in the aggregate values obtained trough the simulation
of both learning scenarios. Previous results corresponding to s-learning have been reported
elsewhere [35]. The performances along the learning paths as well as the incidence of different
initial conditions on the collective behaviour were thoroughly detailed. In a forthcoming paper
[25] we will present an analytical study of the stationary regime attained through the learning
dynamics and probabilistic decision-making.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present the agents model and its statistical
mechanics equilibrium properties. In section 3, we describe the learning scenarios. We present
the general settings of our simulations in section 4 and the results in section 5. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Model with heterogeneous interacting agents
We consider a social system of N heterogeneous agents (i = 1, 2, . . . , N) that must decide either
to buy (ωi = 1) or not (ωi = 0) one unit of a single good at an exogenous price P . Following
Nadal et al. [26] we assume that each agent i has a willingness to pay Hi, which represents
the maximal amount he is ready to pay for the good in the absence of social interactions. The
values Hi are assumed to be randomly distributed among the agents according to a probability
density function of average H and variance σH . In addition to this idiosyncratic term, the
decisions of other agents exert an additive social influence on each individual i, increasing his
willingness to pay if others buy. This influence is assumed to be proportional to the fraction of
buyers (other than i):
ηi ≡ 1
N − 1
N∑
k 6=i
ωk. (1)
The utility of buying, the surplus, for individual i is:
Si = Hi + Jηi − P, (2)
where J > 0, the weight of the social influence, is assumed to be the same for all the agents.
The equilibrium properties of this model have been analyzed using the mean field approx-
imation, for different distributions of the Hi [18, 30]. More recently, the properties for very
general distributions have been determined [17]. Hereafter we briefly summarize the main re-
sults, that we illustrate for the particular case of the triangular distribution considered in our
simulations. The latter allows for a complete analytical equilibrium study [30].
In the thermodynamic limit N →∞, ηi in (1) and (2) may be approximated by
η ≡ 1
N
N∑
k=1
ωk. (3)
It is useful to introduce the following reduced parameters
xi ≡ Hi −H
σH
, j ≡ J
σH
, δ ≡ H − P
σH
, (4)
where δ is the (reduced) gap between the average willingness to pay and the price. xi represents
the (reduced) idiosyncratic preference of agent i. It is a random variable of zero mean and
unitary variance, distributed among the population according to a probability density function
(pdf) f(x).
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A rational agent chooses the strategy ωi that maximizes his (reduced) surplus
si = δ + xi + j η, (5)
that is:
ωi = arg max
ω∈{0,1}
ωsi. (6)
In the thermodynamic limit, the fraction of buyers at equilibrium is equal to the probability of
buying of the population:
η = P(δ + xi + jη > 0) = P(xi > −s), (7)
where s ≡ δ+jη is the population’s average surplus. Solutions to equation (7) give the fractions
of buyers at equilibrium, which depend on the parameters of the model. The properties of the
system may be summarized on a phase diagram, in which the lines separating different regimes
of Nash equilibria are plotted in the space of the model parameters, namely j and δ. The
main results are that if the (reduced) strength of the social interactions j is larger than a
distribution dependent value jB = 1/fmax ( fmax is the maximum of the pdf), there is a range
of values of δ where two different (stable) equilibria coexist: one with a large fraction of buyers,
the efficient Pareto-optimal one where coordination is achieved, and another with a smaller
fraction of buyers. This multiplicity is a generic property of models with social interactions
[17].
In our simulations, the reduced variables xi are randomly distributed according to the
following triangular pdf:
f(x) =
2(2b− x)
9b2
if − b ≤ x ≤ 2b, (8)
with b ≡ √2. Outside the support [−b, 2b], f(x) = 0. The maximum of f(x) is reached at the
left boundary, fmax = f(−b) = 2/(3b). The solutions to (7) are straightforward [30], and are
represented as a function of δ for different values of j on figure 1.
Figure 1: Demand η(j; δ) as a function of δ ≡ h−p for different values of j, for the triangular pdf (8) with maximum
at x = −b. Notice that δ = 0 corresponds to h = p. Unstable solutions are not shown. B: bifurcation point, U,L:
boundaries of the region with multiple equilibria for j = 4.
The critical value of j is jB = 1/fmax ≈ 2.12. For j < jB , η(j; δ) is a single-valued function
(see figure 1 for the particular value j = 1 < jB). If δ < δ0 ≡ −2b prices are so high with
respect to the average willingness to pay of the population that there are no buyers at all
(η = 0), i.e. there is no market. At the other end, if δ > δ1(j) ≡ b − j, prices are so low that
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the market saturates (η = 1). These saturation effects arise because the support of f is finite.
For δ0 ≤ δ ≤ δ1(j), η(j; δ)1 is a monotonically increasing function of δ:
η(j; δ) =
9b2
2j
[1−
√
1− 4j(δ + 2b)
9b2
]− (δ + 2b)
j
. (9)
For j > jB there is a range of values of δ, δU (j) ≤ δ ≤ δL(j) with δL(j) = −2b+ j2B/j and
δU (j) = b − j for which there are two solutions2, that we denote ηU (j; δ) and ηL(j; δ), with
ηU (j; δ) > ηL(j; δ) for all the range of δ where they coexist (see η(j; δ) on figure 1 for j = 4 >
jB). More precisely, the low-η branch, ηL(j; δ), exists for δ < δL(j). Its dependence with j and
δ is the same as in equation (9). At δ = δL(j) it reaches its largest value: ηL(j; δL(j)) ≡ ηL(j).
The high- η branch exists for δ > δU (j). In our case, it corresponds to saturation (ηU (j; δ) = 1).
The Pareto-optimal equilibrium is ηU (j; δ), since it corresponds to the largest utility for all
the buyers, which are in turn more numerous than in the equilibrium ηL(j; δ). However, the
equilibrium actually reached by the system depends on the decision making process, which we
study in the next section.
These results are summarized on the phase diagram of figure 2 where the saturation lines
and the parameter region with two solutions (grey area) are represented.
Figure 2: Customers phase diagram for the triangular pdf (8). Grey region: coexistence of two equilibria. η = 0 is an
equilibrium within the obliquely-hashed region (δ < δ0), η = 1 (saturation) is an equilibrium within the horizontally-
hashed region. Points (a) to (f) refer to the parameters considered in section 5.
3 Learning dynamics
We are interested in the equilibria reached by the system when the customers make their
decisions repeatedly, at successive periods, based on information grasped from their past actions.
We assume that at each period the agents do not know a priori the payoffs corresponding to
each possible strategy. They rely on their own beliefs or estimations to make their decisions.
1We use the convention that the first terms in parenthesis are parameters, and the term after the semicolon
is the variable.
2Notice that δU (j) = δ1(j) is a degeneracy due to the fact that the pdf reaches its maximum at a boundary
of the support.
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In the present case of binary decisions it is sufficient to estimate the difference between the
payoffs expected upon buying with respect to not-buying. Thus, individuals need to estimate a
single value, that we call hereafter attraction for buying, or simply attraction following Camerer
[7].
We consider two different learning scenarios which differ in the kind of information assumed
to be available to the customers. In the first one – that we call s-learning –, customers do not
know the parameters nor the structure of the surplus function on which they have to make
expectations. They make direct estimations of the payoffs expected upon buying (in our model
the expected payoff for not buying vanishes). Starting with some initial beliefs ai(0), at each
iteration t individuals i ∈ {1, . . . , N} make their decisions ωi(t) for the period according to
the attractions ai(t) and then update the latter based on the obtained payoffs si(t). In the
second scenario – called hereafter η -learning –, each agent is assumed to know the gap between
his idiosyncratic willingness to pay and the price (δ + xi) as well as the strength of the social
interactions j. He only needs to estimate the expected fraction of buyers ηˆi(t), in order to
determine his attraction for buying ai(t) = δ + xi + j ηˆi(t).
The system is updated iteratively: at each period t each agent i chooses a strategy ωi(t)
based on his attraction ai(t). This choice may be probabilistic, but here we concentrate on
a deterministic decision making process. Once decisions are made, attractions are updated
using the grasped information. More precisely, the system evolves according to the following
two-steps dynamics:
Making decisions: each individual makes the choice that maximizes his expected payoff.
Thus, if the attraction for buying is positive, the choice is ωi(t) = 1, otherwise ωi(t) = 0. This
is called myopic best response in the literature. Since attractions are estimated payoffs,
ωi(t) = Θ(ai(t)). (10)
where Θ(x) is the Heaviside function (Θ(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0, Θ(x) = 0 otherwise). Notice that this
deterministic decision rule depends only on the sign of the attraction but not on its magnitude.
The surplus or earned payoff is then
si(t) = ωi(t)(δ + xi + jη(t)) (11)
where η(t) is the actual fraction of buyers of the period. Since attractions may be inaccurate or
erroneous estimations of the latter, the agents may make bad decisions and either get negative
payoffs or miss positive ones.
Updating attractions: be zi the quantity on which the individuals make estimations (si or
ηi, depending on the learning scenario). Individual i updates zˆi(t), the estimation at time t,
using the information obtained as a result of his decision ωi(t). The updating rules considered
hereafter have the following structure:
zˆi(t+ 1) = (1− µ) zˆi(t) + µ[∆ + (1−∆)ωi(t)]zi(t) (12)
where 0 < µ < 1 is the learning rate and ∆ is a parameter (0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1) that allows to
update differently zˆi depending on the period’s decision ωi(t). Notice that zi(t) in the right
hand side of (12) is the actual value of z(t) after the decision ωi(t) of period t is made and
the corresponding payoff (if any) is earned. In particular, the learning rule obtained by setting
∆ = 1 in (12) is known in the literature as fictitious play [7, 9]: unconditionally to ωi(t), the
value zˆi(t + 1) is updated using the actual value zi(t). If ∆ = 0, the rule (12) gives raise to
the usual reinforcement learning [12, 33], in which the estimated quantity zˆ is updated only if
ωi(t) = 1. Another well known rule, the standard Cournot best reply [10], in which only the
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previous period counts, is obtained putting µ = 1 and ∆ = 1 in (12). The latter corresponds
to a standard parallel steepest ascent search of the (eventually local) optimum.
In the s-learning scenario, introducing zi(t) = si(t) with si(t) given by equation (11), and
zˆi = ai in equation (12) gives the time evolution of the attraction:
ai(t+ 1) = (1− µ) ai(t) + µ [∆ + (1−∆)ωi(t)] si(t) (13)
In the case of η-learning, zi = ηi and zˆi = ηˆi, so that, after introduction into equation (12)
and some algebra, the evolution of the corresponding attraction is:
ai(t+ 1) = (1− µ) ai(t) + µ (δ + xi + j [∆ + (1−∆)ωi(t)] η(t)) (14)
Both rules coincide within the fictitious play paradigm, i.e. for ∆ = 1.
4 General simulation-settings
In this section we present the common general settings of our simulations. Results obtained
with the two different learning scenarios presented in the preceding section, namely s-learning
and η-learning, are discussed in the next section.
4.1 Systems parameters
Simulations were done for different values of δ, defined by (4). The values of xi, the (centered)
idiosyncratic component of the willingness to pay, are drawn according to the triangular pdf
(8). Since this pdf is a decreasing function of xi, there are fewer individuals with high than
with low values of xi. As a consequence, our histograms of final states as a function of xi have
better statistics for low values than for large values of xi.
We focus on the learning behavior for two values of the social influence weight j, one below,
the other above, the critical value jB = 3b/2 ≈ 2.12 (see section 2). These are j = 1 which has
a single equilibrium for any value of δ, and j = 4, which may present two possible equilibria
for the range δU (j) < δ < δL(j) with δU (4) = −2.5858 and δL(4) = −1.7034. At equilibrium,
due to the boundedness of the support of the IWP, η = 0 below δ0 ≈ 2.83. For j = 1 we have
η = 1 above δ1(1) ≈ 0.41, whereas for j = 4 saturation (η = 1) is a possible equilibrium for
δ > δU (4).
All the presented simulations correspond to systems with N = 1 000 agents, averaged over
100 systems, i.e. corresponding to 100 different realizations of the random idiosyncratic will-
ingnesses to pay (IWP). We present results corresponding to synchronous (parallel) updating,
where the procedure detailed in the preceding section is iterated until convergence. Results with
sequential asynchronous dynamics [35] only differ in the time needed to converge, the reached
equilibria being similar.
We performed thorough simulations, obtaining statistics of learning times, cumulated pay-
offs, etc. In this article we describe the most interesting results, which are the fractions of
buyers and the distribution of attractions at convergence, because they allow to understand the
differences between the different types of learning schemes.
4.2 Initial states
We assume that the agents start with some initial values of their attractions, which represent
their a priori beliefs. Among the different possibilities of defining the initial beliefs, we analyze
systematically three different initializations:
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optimistic: in s-learning, the initial attractions ai(0) are randomly selected positive numbers
in the interval [0, 1] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , so that the very first decision for all the agents is
to buy. In η-learning, the initial values are ηˆi(0) = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , so that the initial
attractions are ai(0) = xi + δ + j. Notice that in this case, the decisions of agents with
xi < −j − δ is not strategic: they will choose not to buy in the first period despite their
optimistic guess on ηˆi(0), because their IWP is too small.
pessimistic: in s-learning, the initial attractions ai(0) are randomly selected negative num-
bers in the interval [−1, 0] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N . At the first iteration, no agent buys.
In η-learning, the initial values are ηˆi(0) = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Here, the choices of
individuals with xi > −δ are not strategic because their payoffs upon buying are posi-
tive independently of the choices of the other agents. Thus, their first period choice is
ωi(0) = 1.
random: in s-learning, the initial attractions ai(0) are randomly selected numbers in the
interval [−1, 1] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N . In η-learning, the initial values ηˆi(0) are random
numbers in [0, 1] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Here, agents with xi + δ > 0 (resp. xi + δ − j < 0)
buy (resp. do not buy) unconditionally to the individual estimations ηˆi(0). Those with
−j < xi+δ < 0, i.e. those whose decision is actually dependent on the collective outcome,
will buy only if ηˆi(0) > −(δ + xi)/j.
The two first initializations correspond to extreme cases. They lead to equilibria that are
respectively upper and lower bounds to the fractions of buyers at equilibrium reached with
other initializations.
5 Simulations results
We first present results obtained with myopic fictitious play, for which both learning scenarios
coincide. This corresponds to the usual dynamics used in spin systems, in which at each iteration
spins are aligned with their local fields. Since the interactions between agents are symmetric,
the system has an underlying energy function. Thus, the dynamics has fixed point attractors,
which are the equilibrium states presented in section 2. These results will serve as reference
against which we compare the results of weighted belief and reinforcement learning.
5.1 Myopic fictitious play
This dynamics is achieved by putting ∆ = 1 and µ = 1 in equation (12). It is called myopic
because it is a response to the previous time step only: agents completely disregard older expe-
riences and do not try to make elaborate expectations on future outcomes. Fictitious because
agents are assumed to have knowledge of the values (s or η) used to build their attractions
independently of whether they buy or not.
The fractions of buyers η at equilibrium, obtained for different values of δ, are presented
on figure 3. Symbols correspond to simulations, the lines being the solutions to the mean field
equation (7) with the triangular IWP distribution (8), represented on figure 1. In the range
0 < η < 1 (excluding η = 0 and η = 1), these solutions are given by equation (9).
Figure 3 (left) displays results for j = 1 < jB . This dynamics corresponds to steepest
ascent in the states space, so that the system reaches the fixed point closest to the initial state.
Since for j = 1 there is only one fixed point for each value of δ, the system converges to it
independently of the initialization. For δ0 ≤ δ ≤ δ1(j), η is the fraction of agents that satisfy
xi + δ + jη > 0. In the region δ > δ1(j), these are all the agents. If δ < δ0, no agent has an
IWP large enough to get a positive payoff, and the equilibrium is η = 0.
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Figure 3: Myopic fictitious play (µ = 1, ∆ = 1). η at equilibrium versus δ ≡ h − p for j = 1 and j = 4. In these
and all the following figures, when non visible, error bars are smaller than the symbols’ sizes. The full lines are the
analytical predictions for the rational (Nash) equilibria. Numerical values of δ0, δ1(j), δU (j) and δL(j) are given in
section 4.1.
For j > jB and δU (j) ≤ δ ≤ δL(j) we expect, based on the phase diagram, that different
initializations lead the system to different equilibria. Indeed, the optimistic (pessimistic) ini-
tialization systematically drives the system to the high-η (low-η) equilibrium. Systems with
random initialization end up at either of the two equilibria, depending on the precise configu-
ration of initial states (see figure 3, right). Actually, with this initialization the distribution of
η is bimodal; this is why the averages in the coexistence region present larger variances than
elsewhere. With different initial fractions of buyers, the number of simulated systems that end
up at each attractor differs.
Figure 4: Myopic fictitious play (µ = 1, ∆ = 1). Attractions at convergence for three different values of δ, as a
function of xi. For j = 1, the fractions of buyers are η(δ = 1.1) = 1, η(δ = −0.5) = 0.403 and η(δ = −3.1) = 0. For
j = 4, η(δ = −1.5) = 1 and η(δ = −3) = 0. For δ = −2 attractions converge to two different fixed points (η = 0.07
and η = 1), depending on the initial condition. The characters in parenthesis refer to the points in the phase diagram
(figure 2).
The stationary distribution of the individual attractions ai of a single typical system are
plotted on figures 4 against the idiosyncratic terms xi, for different values of δ (they correspond
to the equilibrium states (a)− (f) in the phase diagram 2). As expected, the ai are the actual
payoffs at equilibrium, which are proportional to η. The slope of ai vs. xi is 1, as it should,
since ai = δ + xi + jη, the ordinate at the origin being δ + jη.
Results for j = 4 and δ = −2 (point (e) in the phase diagram, inside the coexistence region
δU (4) ≤ δ ≤ δL(4)) show the two possible outcomes, obtained through different initializations,
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corresponding to the two possible fixed points.
5.2 Weighted belief learning
In the weighted belief learning scenario, the information grasped by buyers has a larger weight
than that of non-buyers. This scenario aims at modelizing situations where buyers have first
hand knowledge of the quantities they try to estimate (payoffs or fraction of buyers) whereas
individuals that do not afford the risk of buying have less faithful information. In equation (12)
this is achieved whenever 0 < ∆ < 1.
Figure 5: Weighted belief learning (µ = 0.5, ∆ = 0.5). η at equilibrium versus δ for j = 1 and j = 4, for s-learning
(above) and η-learning (below).
The fractions of buyers η at convergence with ∆ = 0.5 are plotted on figures 5. With s-
learning, both for j < jB and j > jB , equilibria are similar to those with myopic fictitious play,
independently of the type of initialization, although we show later that the learned attractions
are quite different. In contrast, the states reached with η-learning crucially depend on ∆
being smaller than 1. In fact, only with the optimistic initialization the agents may reach
coordination on the optimal equilibrium (if it exists). With the other two initializations non-
buyers systematically underevaluate the social effects by a factor ∆. As a result, the ai’s are
underevaluated and the collective outcomes at equilibrium are not consistent with the phase
diagram. At convergence η is smaller than the optimal value for a large range of δ values (see
figures 5). This decrease in η is most dramatic with the pessimistic initialization. Since with
the random initialization there are more buyers than with the pessimistic initialization from the
beginning, more individuals can correctly estimate their surpluses, and the collective state at
equilibrium has systematically a larger η than when starting with the pessimistic initialization.
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Figure 6: Weighted belief learning (µ = 0.5): dependence of η-learning on ∆: η at equilibrium versus δ for j = 1
and j = 4 with ∆ = 0.2 (above) and ∆ = 0.8 (below).
For smaller values of ∆, the misestimations of the social terms are even more conspicuous,
leading the population to inefficient equilibria with low fractions of buyers for a larger range of
δ values (see figures 6, ∆ = 0.2). Conversely, when ∆ is larger, the actual and the estimated η
are closer to each other, giving results closer to those of fictitious play (see figures 6, ∆ = 0.8).
In the limit ∆ → 1 we obtain the results of section 5.1. The case ∆ = 0 is considered in the
next section.
The individual attractions at convergence of a representative system are represented against
the individual idiosyncratic terms xi on figures 7, for j = 1 and j = 4 and for different values of
δ. In contrast with myopic fictitious play, the slope of the attractions obtained with s-learning
depends on whether individuals are buyers or not: for non-buyers the slope is ∆ whereas it is
1 for buyers, as may be seen on the upper figures 7.
In the case of η-learning it is clear from the updating rule (14) that the attractions as a
function of xi have a slope 1. However, because ∆ < 1, both with the pessimistic and the random
initializations the fractions of non-buyers when j = 1 for δ in the region δ1(j) < δ < b− j∆ (see
figure 5) do not reach the saturation level expected from the phase diagram. The non-buyers
are agents whose initial estimations ηˆi(0) determined negative attractions. When the correcting
term j∆η does not allow to compensate a negative value of δ + xi, these agents persist in non
buying.
When j = 4, for δ > δL(j) there is a fraction of the population that does not buy, due to same
reason as for j < jB . This is why for δ = −1.5 > δL(4), where saturation is expected on the basis
of the phase diagram, we obtain η < 1 with either random or pessimistic initializations. Like
for j = 1, here also saturation is reached independently of the initial state only for δ > b− j∆.
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Figure 7: Weighted belief learning (µ = 0.5, ∆ = 0.5). Attractions at convergence for three values δ, as a function
of xi. Above, for s-learning: η(j = 1, δ = 1.1) = 1, η(j = 1, δ = −0.5) = 0.403 and η(j = 1, δ = −3.1) = 0. For
j = 4, when δ = −2 attractions converge to two different fixed points (with η = 0.078 and η = 1), depending on the
initial condition) whereas η = 1 for δ = −1.5 and η = 0 for δ = −3. Below, for η-learning: η(j = 1, δ = 1.1) = 1,
η(j = 1, δ = −0.5) = 0.382 and η(j = 1, δ = −3.1) = 0. For j = 4, when δ = −2 attractions converge to two different
fixed points (with η = 0.03 and η = 1, depending on the initial condition), whereas η(j = 4, δ = −1.5) = 0.62 and
η(j = 4, δ = −3 = 0 .
5.3 Reinforcement learning
In reinforcement learning, only agents that buy are assumed to have the information necessary
to estimate their attractions. In equation (12) this is achieved with ∆ = 0. This learning
paradigm is also called stimulus-response or rote learning in behavioral psychology [6]. It aims
at modelizing risk-averse individuals that refrain from buying from the start, independently of
the posted price. As we see in the following, such behaviours may hinder the emergence of the
Pareto-optimal equilibrium, where the payoffs are optimal for all the agents, for a large range
of values of δ.
Like in weighted belief learning, the system’s behavior with reinforcement learning strongly
depends on the initial states. In fact, only individuals with ai(0) > 0 can actually learn from
experience because their first decision is to buy. Therefore, the attractions of buyers (but only
these) converge to the actual payoffs si = xi + δ + jη, both with η- and s-learning. Their
values of ai at convergence present a slope 1 as a function of xi. With s-learning non-buyers
(whose attractions are negative) cannot use the information carried by the forgone payoffs.
These agents decrease iteratively by a factor 1 − µ the absolute values of ai at each step of
the learning process. Attractions keep thus their negative signs: the corresponding individuals
persist in state ωi = 0 and the attractions of non-buyers converge to ai = 0 whatsoever the value
of xi. In figure 8 the corresponding ai vs xi present a vanishing slope, and there are individuals
with ai = 0 evenly distributed over the xi axis. Notice that even when δ is large enough (low
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Figure 8: Reinforcement learning (µ = 0.5, ∆ = 0). Attractions at convergence for three values of δ, as a function
of xi. s-learning (above): the fractions of buyers for j = 1 are η(j = 1, δ = 1.1) = 0.52, η(j = 1, δ = −0.5) = 0.203
and η(j = 1, δ = −3.1) = 0. For j = 4, δ = −2, attractions converge to two different fixed points (with η = 0.022 and
η = 1, depending on the initial condition), whereas η(j = 4, δ = −1.5) = 0.095 and η(j = 4, δ = −3) = 0. η-learning
(below): η(j = 1, δ = 1.1) = 0.985, η(j = 1, δ = −0.5) = 0.374 and η(j = 1, δ − 3.1) = 0. For j = 4, δ = −2
attractions converge to two different fixed points (η = 0.03 and η = 1, depending on the initial condition), whereas
η(j = 4, δ = −1.5) = 0.294 and η(j = 4, δ = −3) = 0.
enough price) to allow everybody get positive payoffs, at equilibrium there remain non-buyers
with vanishing attractions independently of their value of xi. On figure 9, the fraction of buyers
η (with random initialization) is seen to be systematically smaller than the fraction expected
from the phase diagram. Since in our random initialization setting the initial values ai(0) are
selected with equal probabilities of being positive or negative, the initial fraction of buyers is
η(0) = 0.5. Since those who begin with ai(0) < 0 are unable to change their mind, the upper
bound to η is 1/2, as is seen in the upper figures 9. For the same reasons, with the pessimistic
initialization nobody buys independently of δ. Only with the optimistic initialization all the
individuals can learn and make correct estimations of their payoffs: the corresponding curves
η vs. δ are similar to those with myopic best response.
With η-learning the behavior is closer to that of weighted belief learning: the curves η(j; δ)
follow the same trends as in figures 6. The attractions of buyers (non-buyers) converge to
ai = δ + xi + jη (ai = δ + xi). The range of xi values where individuals may have different
ai even if they have similar xi is obtained like with weighted belief learning, putting ∆ = 0
in the equations. This gives −δ − jη < xi < −δ. This is illustrated on figures 8 (below), and
explains why here also the values of η at convergence are systematically smaller (or equal) to
those expected at the Nash equilibrium, as may be seen on figures 9 (below). Notice that with
η-learning, even if non-buyers do not use the information about η, they may still buy provided
that xi + δ > 0, independently of the initial guess ηi(0). This is why η may be larger than with
s-learning at convergence, see figure 9 (below), and even reach saturation provided δ is large
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Figure 9: Reinforcement learning (µ = 0.5, ∆ = 0). η at equilibrium versus δ ≡ h − p for j = 1 and j = 4, for
s-learning (above) and η-learning (below).
enough. The same argument as in the preceding section shows that saturation can be reached
only if δ > b.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
It is interesting to compare the results obtained with weighted belief learning to those with re-
inforcement learning. In both cases, the equilibrium values of the attractions may be calculated
by replacing ai(t), η(t), ωi(t) in (13) and (14) by their asymptotic values ai, η and ωi. With
s-learning these are ai = [∆ + (1 −∆)ωi]si: the attractions of buyers converge to ai = si, i.e.
they estimate correctly their expected surplus. Non-buyers estimate ai = ∆si. With η-learning
we have ai = xi + δ + jη[∆ + (1 −∆)ωi]. Thus buyers also correctly estimate their expected
surplus, and non-buyers underestimate it, since their attractions converge to ai = xi+ δ+ j∆η.
With weighted belief s-learning, the agents always estimate the right sign of the attraction
independently on whether they are buyers or non-buyers, so that the system converges to the
theoretical Nash equilibrium despite the incorrect estimations by non-buyers. This is not true
for reinforcement learning (∆ = 0), because in this case the attractions of non-buyers converge
to ai = si∆ = 0. As a result, at equilibrium we expect fewer buyers than with weighted belief
learning, because with reinforcement learning individuals that have initial negative attractions
persist in non-buying even if they could obtain positive payoffs.
With η-learning, like with s-learning, buyers’ asymptotic attractions converge to the actual
surpluses both with weighted belief and with reinforcement learning: ai = si. Non-buyers’
surplus estimations converges to ai = si − (1 − ∆)jη, which may be negative even if si >
14
0. Therefore, in contrast with s-learning, weighted belief η -learning may fail to reach the
theoretical Nash equilibria. With reinforcement learning, on the other hand, η-learning may
be more performant than s-learning, since non-buyers’ estimations converge to ai = δ + xi,
i.e., they disregard the social component of the surplus but take into account correctly their
idiosyncratic preferences. Therefore, the fraction of buyers increases with δ, without getting
stuck at a value determined only by the initial conditions, as happens with s-learning.
The comparison of s- and η-learning with the same parameters shows that with weighted
belief learning, η-learning converges to fewer buyers than s-learning, because in the latter case
the sign of the surplus is correctly estimated. This is a rather counterintuitive result, since
individuals using s-learning have a poorer knowledge of the payoff structure. On the other hand,
η-learning allows to get closer to the theoretical Nash equilibria because the agents know their
preferences, and only misestimate the fraction of buyers. To summarize, with reinforcement
learning the quality of the equilibria with the two learning scenarios is inversed with respect to
the one in weighted belief learning. In η -learning, agents with the a priori knowledge about xi
and j drive the system through learning to states with larger fractions η than with s-learning,
where agents do not have this a priori information.
We only considered 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1, implying that non-buyers may only underestimate the
learned quantity (be it the forgone payoff or the fraction of buyers). Values ∆ > 1 allow to
modelize the non-buyers regret about their chosen strategy. These ∆ values can only lead
to overestimations of the learned term, helping non-buyers to increase faster their attractions
for buying. The result would be an acceleration of convergence. Since buyers make correct
estimations, we expect that, except for reinforcement s-learning, the final states be the same
as with fictitious play. With reinforcement s-learning, the results would be the same as those
presented here.
To conclude, our results show that systems with interacting rational agents with limited
information may not reach the theoretical Nash equilibria, even when these are unique. If the
social interactions are so strong that there are multiple Nash equilibria, the resulting collective
state is very sensitive to the agents’ initial guesses of the opportunity of buying.
We restricted our simulations to systems where all the agents use the same learning rule.
Further investigations should consider mixtures of different kinds of learners.
Our agents used deterministic learning rules. One drawback is that their decisions are
independent of the magnitude of the attraction: only its sign matters. Probabilistic decision
rules, where the uncertainty of the choice is larger the closer the attraction to 0, have been
studied in a related model where adaptive customers have to choose between different sellers
[37, 27], in a particular context where fictitious play is not possible. There, the existence of
multi-equilibria is shown to lead to a transition between an unfaithful and a faithful behaviour
(customers going to different sellers in the first case, and preferring one particular seller in
the other case). Within our general framework we have studied the adaptive dynamics with
probabilistic decision rules. A typical result is that the population reaches states in which
decisions fluctuate close to the average ones. This stationary regime is in general close to
the ‘quantal response equilibrium’ [24] described in economics. In addition, a more complex
stationary state can be obtained when the choice uncertainty is strong enough. A detailed
analysis of the collective behaviour under such probabilistic decision rules will be presented
elsewhere [25].
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